Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Thursday, February 28, 2008
Photo gives face to Anne Frank's "one true love"
A photograph of Peter Schiffer published by Reuters. READ NEWS HERE. The one with the "beautiful brown eyes" who Anne Frank recalled as her "one true love" in the diary she wrote whilst in hiding in the Nazi-occupied Netherlands.
The following is an excerpt of of Anne Frank's true diary from the critical edition which details her 13th birthday.Only a very few fragments of this text appear in the published Diary. Those passages which appeared are italicized, including a reference to Peter Schiffer.
Sunday 14 June 1942.
I think the next few pages will all have the same (page) date, because I still have a lot to tell you.
I'll start with the moment I got you, or rather saw you lying on my birthday table, (because the buying, when I was there as well, doesn't count.)
On Friday, June 12th, I woke up at six o'clock, and no wonder; it was my birthday. But of course I was not allowed to get up at that hour, so I had to contain my curiosity until a quarter to seven. Then I could bear it no longer, and went to the dining room, where I received a warm welcome from Moortje (the cat).
I closed the communicating doors of course. Soon after seven went to Mummy and Daddy and then to the sitting room to undo my presents, the first to greet me was you, possibly the nicest of all. Then on the there were a bunch of roses, a plant, and some peonies, and more arrived during the day.
From Mummy and Daddy I got a blue blouse, Variety, which is the latest party game for adults, something like Monopoly, a bottle of grape juice, which to my mind tasted a bit like wine, and which has now begun to ferment and I may have been right, since wine is made from grapes after all; then a puzzle; a bottle of peek-aroma "with acorns" (I got that later, I mean "the acorns"; a jar of ointment; a 2½ guilder banknote; a token for two books; a book from Katze, the Camera Obscura, but Margot has got that already, so I swapped it; a plate of home-made biscuits, baked by me, of course, for I'm very keen on baking biscuits at the moment; a little dish of molasses candy, but it is horribly sticky; a bowl of "truffles," from Daddy; a little plate of Marie biscuits; a letter from Grandma, right on time, but that was an accident, of course; and a home-made.
Then I came home at five o'clock, because I had gone to gymnastics, (although I am not allowed to do it because my arms and legs go out of joint) and I chose volleyball for my classmates as my birthday game. Later they all danced in a circle around me and sang "happy birthday to you". When I got home Sanne Ledermann was already there, and I'd brought Ilse Wagner, Hanneli Goslar and Jacqueline van Maarsen along with me from gymnastics, because they are in my class. Hanneli and Sanne used to be my two best friends, and people who saw us together always said there they go Anne, Hanne and Sanne.3 I only got to know Jacqueline van Maarsen at the Jewish Secondary School and she is known as my best friend. Ilse is Hanneli's best friend, and Sanne goes to a different school, where she has her friends.
Five of us formed a club called "the little bear, minus 2" or t.l.B-2 for short. That was because we thought the little Bear had 5 stars, but we were wrong there, because it has seven stars, just like the great Bear; minus 2 therefore means that Sanne is the leader and Jacque is the secretary and that we (Ilse Hanneli and I) are left to make up the club. It's a ping-pong club.
I was given a lovely book on the occasion namely Tales and Legends of the Netherlands by Joseph Cohen, but unfortunately they gave me the second part, and so I swapped the Camera Obscura for Tales and Legends of the Netherlands part 1, including a book from Mummy, for it is very expensive. I got 6 beautiful carnations from Hello. Hello is a second cousin or a first cousin once removed of Wilma de Jonge, and Wilma de Jonge is a girl who takes our tram and who seemed very nice at first and actually is quite nice, but she talks all day long about nothing but boys and that gets a bit tiresome.
Hello has a girl friend Ursula or Ursul for short.
But I am his real girl friend odd isn't it!
Everyone thinks I'm in love with Hello, but that is absolutely untrue. Aunt Helene brought me a puzzle; aunt Stephanie a lovely little brooch; aunt Leny a marvelous book Daisy's travel adventures, and a bracelet from Anne with a kiss; Mr. Wronker a box of Droste and a game; Mrs. Lederman a roll of acid drops; Mrs. Pfeffer a roll of acid drops; Mr. van Maarsen a bunch of sweet peas;
Peter van Pels a bar of milk chocolate, Mrs Pfeffer and Mr. Wronker flowers as well and so I was thoroughly spoiled. This afternoon I also got something from the children in my class. Yesterday evening we showed a film "The lighthouse keeper", with Rin-tin-tin; and we're going to have it this afternoon again, lovely!!!!
I shall still get the Myths of Greece and Rome with my own money. Another book from Mr. Kohnke and at Blankevoort's a box for storing Variety. Now I must stop next time I'll have so much to write in you again, that is to tell you, bye-bye, we're going to be great pals.
Daisy's mountain holiday is really a very beautiful book; I was deeply moved by the story about the girl who was so rich and yet so good and who died at the end, but that was inevitable and precisely what makes it so beautiful.
This morning in my bath I was thinking how wonderful it would be if I had a dog like Rin-tin-tin. I would call him Rin-tin-tin too and he'd be at school all the time with the caretaker or if the weather was good in the bicycle shed. I have made a rough sketch of my underground palace, as I call it to myself. I hope that this wish of mine will be fulfilled one day, but there would have to be a miracle then, since it doesn't usually happen that food and money and things like that are supplied all the time and that you can set sail even to America or that you can just disappear under the ground and then live there, it's too beautiful to be true. Mummy always wants to know who I'm going to marry, but I don't think she'll ever guess that it's Peter, because I managed without blushing or flickering an eyelid, to get that idea right out of their minds. I am fonder of Peter [Shiffer] than I have ever been of anyone else, and I keep telling myself that it's only to hide his feelings that Peter goes round with all those girls; he also probably thinks that Hello and I are in love, which is quite untrue, because he is just a friend or as Mummy puts it one of my beaux.
Sunday, February 24, 2008
3rd Asia Pacific Messianic Fellowship Yeshiva
This is a three-day seminar course offered in different cities in the Philippines and in Tokyo, Japan.
Metro Manila. March 15-17, 2008.
Ted Franco 0917-838-3721
Joanne Anonuevo 0906-458-7490.
Yeshiva Fee P600 inclusive of lunch and material.
Cebu. March 20-22.
Joel Cruz 0922-424-3025
Imee Alcantara 0922-851-2454
Banaue. March 24-26(abbreviated course).
Butch Sarol 0921-990-7536
Baguio. March 28-30.
Amos Baucas 0928-332-2201
Linnette Baucas 0919-668-5191
Tokyo, Japan. April 3-6.
Roger Walkwitz 0920-314-4324
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Standing With Israel
As published in Petah Tikvah Asia Pacific Messianic Edition, February 2008
As the State of Israel celebrates its 60th Independence Day Anniversary on May of this year, the horror of seeing it divided looms inevitably larger. The moral confusion, distorted guilt, and false hopes is evident as the nation succumbs to the pressure to accept United States proposal for a Two-State solution. Writing several years ago about Israel's Oslo Agreements, Israeli novelist Aharon Megged observed: "We have witnessed a phenomenon which probably has no parallel in history; an emotional and moral identification by the majority of Israel's intelligentsia with people openly committed to our annihilation." This identification has been reinforced in a constant succession of Israeli governments.
David Be Guion flanked by the members of his provisional government reading the declaration of independence in the Tel Aviv Museum Hall.
Land for Peace
A lesson in the Torah would prove handy on how to deal with bellicose neighbors. In the case of Jepthah, in the Book of Judges, he has to confront the Ammonite King's argument: “Israel took my land…and now, return them in peace." This is exactly the same formula that present day Arabs proffer: land for peace. But unlike the present leaders of Israel, Jepthah did not balk, giving instead the King of Ammon a detailed geography and history lesson. This debunking of the Ammonite claim is hinged on the theological right of Israel that "the whole world belongs to the Holy One blessed be He: He created it and He gave it to whomever it was right in His eyes to give it. Through His will He gave it to them and through His will He took it from them and gave it to us".
As we advance Israel’s right over Judea and Samaria, we do so, on the basis of their biblical, historical, legal, pragmatic and prophetic aspect. No other people would have a comparable pedigree to justify their legitimacy to live on their homeland than Israel.
The Biblical Right
I Am God Almighty; walk before me and be blameless. I will confirm my covenant between me and you… the whole land of Canaan, where you are now an alien, I will give as an everlasting possession to you and your descendants after you. (Genesis 17:1,8)
This covenant was confirmed time and again with Moses, Joshua, David and Solomon. Judea and Samaria covers Bethel, Shiloh, Shechem, Bethany, Bethlehem, Hebron and Jerusalem. These are the mountains of Israel, the very heart of the land promised by God to the Children of Israel.
Historical Right
Ninety years ago, Britain, thru Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, promised a national home for the Jewish people. This promise was soon realized at the end of World War I, when the British and French drew up borders on the former Ottoman Empire. Later in 1920, League of Nations came into force which gave birth to “Mandate for Palestine” that laid down the Jewish Legal Right to settle in the land. Almost at the same time after World War II, these mandates had been replaced by monarchies in Iraq and Jordan and republican governments in Israel, Lebanon and Syria. No one debates the legitimacy of these Arab nations who were all defined, protected and later granted independence by the United Nation. If they are legitimate sovereign nations, so is Israel.
Legal Aspect over Judea and Samaria
In 1947, United Nation Resolution 181 recommended to partition the territory still subject to the Mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state. This could have handed over Judea and Samaria to an Arab State. The Jews accepted the recommendation but the Palestinian Arabs and their brethren rejected it. The UN Partition of Palestine merely recognized the Jewish right to statehood, but it is not legally valid to define its territory as it was rejected by the Arabs. Resolution 181’s validity hinged on acceptance of the General Assembly’s recommendation by both parties Thus, the UN Partition plan has not superceded or annulled the original Mandate.
When seven Arab armies from neighboring states invaded the territory, in an attempt to prevent the establishment of a Jewish State in accordance with the UN Partition Plan, the Jewish state not only survived, but came into possession of territories from the land of its adversaries.
A case in point is Judea and Samaria. Yehuda Z. Blum’s advances the "missing reversioner theory” by stating that Jordan's aggression against Israel in 1967 caused it to lose its title to the West Bank, creating a sovereignty vacuum that Israel stepped in to fill. In that case, the Fourth Geneva Convention would not apply because Israel had not occupied another state's sovereign territory, there was no sovereign to whom the territory could revert, and the settlements could not be in violation of the Convention.
Pragmatic Aspect
As much as the reality of incessant terrorist attacks affords the Israelis no choice but to hope for a two-state solution, the faulty assumptions that the Palestinian Arab society will be good neighbors towards Israel is nothing less but a pipe-dream. The 100 years of chronic Arab rejectionism towards Israel will not change overnight. At the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the Arab world's refusal to accept a non-Muslim political entity
in the Middle East. From the Balfour Declaration, UN Partition Plan, Camp David Talks, Madrid Conference, Oslo Accords up to the Middle East Road Map, Arab response is consistently the two-pronged offensive that dovetails diplomacy with violence. In short, the Arabs, and particularly the Palestinians, have flatly refused to recognize Israel’s legitimate existence or to negotiate genuine compromise. Instead, they have maintained to drive the Jews out to the Mediterranean Sea through violence and terror.
Hopes on the ‘peace process’ exacted a terrible toll on Israel. The 256 people killed in Israel by Palestinian terrorists in the five years following signing of the first Oslo Accord, was greater than the 216 killed in the 15 years preceding the agreement. From 1993-2005, the ‘Oslo experiment’ cost the lives of 1,340 persons, half of whom are victims of suicide bombings.
Prophetic Fulfillment
“I am going to make Jerusalem a cup that sends all the surrounding people reeling, Judah will be besieged as well as Jerusalem. On that day, when all nations of the world be gathered against her, I will make Jerusalem an immovable rock for all nations. All who try to move it will injure themselves.” (Zechariah 12)
The United Nations, United States and the European Union have unceasingly broker for the peace process that forces Israel to give up Judea and Samaria. In a frantic effort of bolstering the establishment of the State of Palestine before his term ends this year, President Bush hosted the Annapolis Conference and later visited the Holy Land. In response, Jewish religious groups articulated their sentiments in a scroll addressed to the US president: “No government in Israel and no representative of the Jewish people has the power or right to alter, by even the slightest degree, our covenant with God and the words of our holy Torah, which are everlasting, as expressed by the prophets of Israel. Thus any desire, plan or agreement that challenges the eternal sovereignty and active possession of the nation of Israel over her entire land is utterly worthless, and has no basis in reality.”
Our Response
More than ever, our generation has this privilege to be part of unfolding fulfillment of biblical prophecy. As Israel celebrates their 60th Founding Anniversary on the 8th of May this year, Filipinos can stand and be counted as we join the 3rd Israel Solidarity March in Metro Manila. Aligning ourselves with the Word of God is a matter of national survival.
Israel Solidarity March in Makati Avenue, August 2006
For participation, please contact:
Mount Zion Center
102 Sterten Place, 116 Maginhawa St.
Teachers Village, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila
(632) 396-2660
admin@mzci.org
Tuesday, February 5, 2008
Suicide Bombing in Dimona
New wave of suicide bombings in Israel. Not surprising because of months of Palestinian hate promotion as shown in video below.
Thursday, January 31, 2008
Winograd Report
Press Release via The Jerusalem Post
The following is an official statement detailing the Winograd Committee's announcement on their Final Report.
Good Evening.
About an hour ago we submitted the Final Report of the Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 to the Prime Minister, Mr. Ehud Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak.
The task given to us was difficult and complex. It involved the examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the scrutiny of events before the war, since the IDF had left Lebanon in 2000. This covered extensive, charged and complex facts, unprecedented in any previous Commission of Inquiry.
The fact that the Government of Israel opted for such an examination, and that the army conducted a large number of inquires of a variety of military events, are a sign of strength, and an indication that the political and military leaders of Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical review and to painful but required mending.
We have included in the classified version of the Report all the relevant facts we have found concerning the 2nd Lebanon war, systematically and in a chronological order. This presentation of the factual basis was an important part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that no single decision maker had access to a similar factual basis. In this task we had a unique advantage over others who have written about this war, since we had access to a lot of primary and comprehensive material, and the opportunity to clarify the facts by questioning many witnesses, commanders and soldiers, including bereaved families.
For obvious reasons, the unclassified report does not include the many facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the state's security and foreign affairs. We tried, nonetheless, to balance between the wish to present the public with a meaningful picture of the events and the needs of security. We should note that we did not take the mere fact that some data has already been published in the media as a reason for including it in our unclassified report.
We, the members of the Commission, acted according to the main objectives for which the Commission was established - to respond to the ill feelings of the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of the 2nd Lebanon War, and from the way it was managed by the political and military echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the failings of the war and its flaws, and to repair what is required, quickly and resolutely. We regarded as most important to investigate deeply what had happened, as a key to drawing lessons for the future, and their implementation.
This conception of our role was one of the main reasons for our decision not to include in the Final Report personal conclusions and recommendations. We believe that the primary need for improvements applies to the structural and systemic malfunctioning revealed in the war - on all levels.
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the fact we refrained from imposing personal responsibility does not imply that no such responsibility exists. We also wish to repeat our statement from the Interim Report: We will not impose different standards of responsibility to the political and the military echelons, or to persons of different ranks within them.
Let us emphasize: when we imposed responsibility on a system, an echelon or a unit, we did not imply that the responsibility was only or mainly of those who headed it at the time of the war.
Often, such responsibility stemmed from a variety of factors outside the control of those at the head. In addition, a significant part of the responsibility for the failures and flaws we have found lies with those who had been in charge of preparedness and readiness in the years before the war.
The purpose of this press release is not to sum up the Final Report. Rather, it is to present its highlights. The report itself includes discussions of many important issues, which are an inseparable part of the report, its conclusions and recommendations.
In the Final Report we dealt mainly with the events of the period after the initial decision to go to war, which we had discussed in the Interim Report. Yet the events of the period covered by the Final Report took place under the shadow of the constraints created by the decision to go to war, with all its failings and flaws.
We want to stress that we stand behind everything we said in the Interim Report, and the two parts of the report complement each other.
Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon War as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. After a long period of using only standoff fire power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive, very close to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed. These facts had far-reaching implications for us, as well as for our enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world.
In the period we examined in the Final Report - from July 18, 2006, to August 14, 2006- again troubling findings were revealed, some of which had already been mentioned in the Interim Report:
·We found serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes and staff-work in the political and the military echelons and their interface.
·We found serious failings and flaws in the quality of preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF high command, especially in the Army.
·We found serious failings and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the military echelons.
·We found severe failings and flaws in the defense of the civilian population and in coping with its being attacked by rockets.
·These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the 2nd Lebanon war.
The decision made in the night of July 12th - to react (to the kidnapping) with immediate and substantive military action, and to set for it ambitious goals - limited Israel's range of options. In fact, after the initial decision had been made, Israel had only two main options, each with its coherent internal logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages. The first was a short, painful, strong and unexpected blow on Hizbullah, primarily through standoff fire-power. The second option was to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, including a temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and 'cleaning' it of Hizbullah military infrastructure.
The choice between these options was within the exclusive political discretion of the government; however, the way the original decision to go to war had been made; the fact Israel went to war before it decided which option to select, and without an exit strategy - all these constituted serious failures, which affected the whole war. Responsibility for these failures lay, as we had stressed in the Interim Report, on both the political and the military echelons.
After the initial decision to use military force, and to the very end of the war, this period of 'equivocation' continued, with both the political and the military echelon not deciding between the two options: amplifying the military achievement by a broad military ground offensive, or abstaining from such a move and seeking to end the war quickly. This 'equivocation' did hurt Israel. Despite awareness of this fact, long weeks passed without a serious discussion of these options, and without a decision - one way or the other - between them.
In addition to avoiding a decision about the trajectory of the military action, there was a very long delay in the deployment necessary for an extensive ground offensive, which was another factor limiting Israel's freedom of action and political flexibility: Till the first week of August, Israel did not prepare the military capacity to start a massive ground operation.
As a result, Israel did not stop after its early military achievements, and was 'dragged' into a ground operation only after the political and diplomatic timetable prevented its effective completion. The responsibility for this basic failure in conducting the war lies at the doorstep of both the political and the military echelons.
The overall image of the war was a result of a mixture of flawed conduct of the political and the military echelons and the interface between them, of flawed performance by the IDF, and especially the ground forces, and of deficient Israeli preparedness. Israel did not use its military force well and effectively, despite the fact that it was a limited war initiated by Israel itself. At the end of the day, Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military successes; rather, it relied on a political agreement, which included positive elements for Israel, which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.
This outcome was primarily caused by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theater of operations, of the IDF's readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve a political and diplomatic goal.
All in all, the IDF failed, especially because of the conduct of the high command and the ground forces, to provide an effective military response to the challenge posed to it by the war in Lebanon, and thus failed to provide the political echelon with a military achievement that could have served as the basis for political and diplomatic action. Responsibility for this outcomes lies mainly with the IDF, but the misfit between the mode of action and the goals determined by the political echelon share responsibility.
We should note that, alongside the failures in the IDF performance, there were also important military achievements. Special mention should go to the great willingness of the soldiers, especially reserve soldiers, to serve and fight in the war, as well as the many instances of heroism, courage, self-sacrifice and devotion of many commanders and soldiers.
The air force should be congratulated on very impressive achievements in this war. However, there were those in the IDF high command, joined by some in the political echelon, who entertained a baseless hope that the capabilities of the air force could prove decisive in the war. In fact, the impressive achievements of the air force were necessarily limited, and were eroded by the weaknesses in the overall performance of the IDF.
The "Hannit" episode colored to a large extent the whole performance of the Navy, despite the fact that it made a critical contribution to the naval blockade, and provided the Northern Command with varied effective support of its fighting.
We should also note that the war had significant diplomatic achievements. SC resolution 1701, and the fact it was adopted unanimously, were an achievement for Israel. This conclusion stands even if it turns out that only a part of the stipulations of the resolution were implemented or will be implemented, and even if it could have been foreseen that some of them would not be implemented. This conclusion also does not depend on the intentions or goals of the powers that supported the resolution.
We note, however, that we have seen no serious staff work on Israeli positions in the negotiations. This situation improved in part when the team headed by the prime minister's head of staff was established. The team worked efficiently and with dedication, professionalism and coordination. This could not compensate, however, for the absence of preparatory staff work and discussions in the senior political echelon.
This fact may have much significance to the way Israel conducts negotiations, and to the actual content of the arrangements reached. In such negotiations, decisions are often made that may have far-reaching implications on Israel's interests, including the setting of precedents.
The staff work done in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the adoption of a favorable resolution in the Security Council was, in the main, quick, systematic and efficient. At the same time, for a variety of reasons, it did not reflect clear awareness of the essential need to maintain an effective relationship between military achievements and diplomatic activities.
We now turn to the political and military activity concerning the ground operation at the end of the war. This is one of the central foci of public debate.
True, in hindsight, the large ground operation did not achieve its goals of limiting the rocket fire and changing the picture of the war. It is not clear what the ground operation contributed to speeding up the diplomatic achievement or improving it. It is also unclear to what extent starting the ground offensive affected the reactions of the government of Lebanon and Hezbollah to the ceasefire.
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the evaluation of these decisions should not be made with hindsight. It cannot depend on the achievements or the costs these decisions in fact had. The evaluation must be based only on the reasons for the operation, and its risks and prospects as they were known - or as they should have been known - when it was decided upon.
Moreover, it is impossible to evaluate the ground operation at the end of the war without recalling the developments that preceded it and the repeated delays in the adoption of the Security Council resolution; and as a part of the overall conduct of the war.
Against this background, we make the following findings on the main decisions:
The cabinet decision of August 9th - to approve in principle the IDF plan, but to authorize the PM and the MOD to decide if and when it should be activated, according to the diplomatic timetable - was almost inevitable, giving the Israeli government necessary military and political flexibility.
The decision to start in fact the ground operation was within the political and professional discretion of its makers, on the basis of the facts before them. The goals of the ground operation were legitimate, and were not exhausted by the wish to hasten or improve the diplomatic achievement. There was no failure in that decision in itself, despite its limited achievements and its painful costs.
Both the position of the Prime minister - who had preferred to avoid the ground operation - and the position of the Minister of Defense - who had thought it would have served Israel's interest to go for it - had been taken on the merits and on the basis of evidence. Both enjoyed serious support among the members of the general staff of the IDF and others. Even if both statesmen took into account political and public concerns - a fact we cannot ascertain - we believe that they both acted out of a strong and sincere perception of what they thought at the time was Israel's interest.
We want to stress: The duty to make these difficult decisions was the political leaders'. The sole test of these decisions is public and political.
At the same time, we also note that:
We have not found within either the political or the military echelons a serious consideration of the question whether it was reasonable to expect military achievements in 60 hours that could have contributed meaningfully to any of the goals of the operation;
We have not found that the political echelon was aware of the details of the fighting in real time, and we have not seen a discussion, in either the political or the military echelons, of the issue of stopping the military operation after the Security Council resolution was adopted;
We have not seen an explanation of the tension between the great effort to get additional time to conclude the first stage of the planned ground operation and the decisions not to go on fighting until the ceasefire itself.
A description of failures in the conduct of war may be regarded as harming Israel. There will be those who may use our findings to hurt Israel and its army. We nonetheless point out these failures and shortcomings because we are certain that only in this way Israel may come out of this ordeal strengthened. We are pleased that processes of repair have already started. We recommend a deep and systematic continuation of such processes.
It is exclusively in the hands of Israeli leaders and public to determine whether, when facing challenges in the future, we will come to them more prepared and ready, and whether we shall cope with them in a more serious and responsible way than the way the decision-makers had acted - in the political and the military echelons -- in the 2nd Lebanon war.
Our recommendations contain suggestions for systemic and deep changes in the modalities of thinking and acting of the political and military echelons and their interface, in both routine and emergency, including war. These are deep and critical processes. Their significance should not be obscured by current affairs, local successes or initial repairs. A persistent and prolonged effort, on many levels, will be needed in order to bring about the essential improvements in the ways of thinking and acting of the political-military systems.
For these reasons we would like to caution against dangers which might upset plans and delay required change processes, and thus produce dangerous results:
Fear of criticism in case of failure may lead to defensive reactions, working by the book, and abstention from making resolute decisions and preferring non-action. Such behavior is undesirable and also dangerous.
In a dynamic complex reality, one should not prepare better for the last war. It is also essential not to limit oneself to superficial action, designed to create an appearance that flaws had been corrected.
It is also essential not to focus exclusively on coping with dangers, but to combine readiness for threat scenarios with an active seeking of opportunities.
When speaking on learning, one should take into account that enemies, too, are learning their lessons.
The 2nd Lebanon War has brought again to the foreground for thought and discussion issues that some parts of Israeli society had preferred to suppress: Israel cannot survive in this region, and cannot live in it in peace or at least non-war, unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings believe that Israel has the political and military leadership, military capabilities, and social robustness that will allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm her, and to prevent them - if necessary through the use of military force - from achieving their goal.
These truths do not depend on one's partisan or political views. Israel must - politically and morally - seek peace with its neighbors and make necessary compromises. At the same time, seeking peace or managing the conflict must come from a position of social, political and military strength, and through the ability and willingness to fight for the state, its values and the security of its population even in the absence of peace.
These truths have profound and far-reaching implications for many dimensions of life in Israel and the ways its challenges are managed.
Beyond examining the way the Lebanon War was planned and conducted; beyond the examination of flaws in decision-making and performance that had been revealed in it - important as they may be;
these are the central questions that the Lebanon war has raised. These are issues that lie at the very essence of our existence here as a Jewish and democratic state. These are the questions we need to concentrate on.
We hope that our findings and conclusions in the Interim and the Final Reports will bring about not only a redress of failings and flaws, but help Israeli society, its leaders and thinkers, to advance the long-term goals of Israel, and develop the appropriate ways to address the challenges and respond to them.
We are grateful for the trust put in us when this difficult task was given to us. If we succeed in facilitating rectification of the failings we have identified - this will be our best reward.
Thank you.
The following is an official statement detailing the Winograd Committee's announcement on their Final Report.
Good Evening.
About an hour ago we submitted the Final Report of the Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 to the Prime Minister, Mr. Ehud Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak.
The task given to us was difficult and complex. It involved the examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the scrutiny of events before the war, since the IDF had left Lebanon in 2000. This covered extensive, charged and complex facts, unprecedented in any previous Commission of Inquiry.
The fact that the Government of Israel opted for such an examination, and that the army conducted a large number of inquires of a variety of military events, are a sign of strength, and an indication that the political and military leaders of Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical review and to painful but required mending.
We have included in the classified version of the Report all the relevant facts we have found concerning the 2nd Lebanon war, systematically and in a chronological order. This presentation of the factual basis was an important part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that no single decision maker had access to a similar factual basis. In this task we had a unique advantage over others who have written about this war, since we had access to a lot of primary and comprehensive material, and the opportunity to clarify the facts by questioning many witnesses, commanders and soldiers, including bereaved families.
For obvious reasons, the unclassified report does not include the many facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the state's security and foreign affairs. We tried, nonetheless, to balance between the wish to present the public with a meaningful picture of the events and the needs of security. We should note that we did not take the mere fact that some data has already been published in the media as a reason for including it in our unclassified report.
We, the members of the Commission, acted according to the main objectives for which the Commission was established - to respond to the ill feelings of the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of the 2nd Lebanon War, and from the way it was managed by the political and military echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the failings of the war and its flaws, and to repair what is required, quickly and resolutely. We regarded as most important to investigate deeply what had happened, as a key to drawing lessons for the future, and their implementation.
This conception of our role was one of the main reasons for our decision not to include in the Final Report personal conclusions and recommendations. We believe that the primary need for improvements applies to the structural and systemic malfunctioning revealed in the war - on all levels.
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the fact we refrained from imposing personal responsibility does not imply that no such responsibility exists. We also wish to repeat our statement from the Interim Report: We will not impose different standards of responsibility to the political and the military echelons, or to persons of different ranks within them.
Let us emphasize: when we imposed responsibility on a system, an echelon or a unit, we did not imply that the responsibility was only or mainly of those who headed it at the time of the war.
Often, such responsibility stemmed from a variety of factors outside the control of those at the head. In addition, a significant part of the responsibility for the failures and flaws we have found lies with those who had been in charge of preparedness and readiness in the years before the war.
The purpose of this press release is not to sum up the Final Report. Rather, it is to present its highlights. The report itself includes discussions of many important issues, which are an inseparable part of the report, its conclusions and recommendations.
In the Final Report we dealt mainly with the events of the period after the initial decision to go to war, which we had discussed in the Interim Report. Yet the events of the period covered by the Final Report took place under the shadow of the constraints created by the decision to go to war, with all its failings and flaws.
We want to stress that we stand behind everything we said in the Interim Report, and the two parts of the report complement each other.
Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon War as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. After a long period of using only standoff fire power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive, very close to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed. These facts had far-reaching implications for us, as well as for our enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world.
In the period we examined in the Final Report - from July 18, 2006, to August 14, 2006- again troubling findings were revealed, some of which had already been mentioned in the Interim Report:
·We found serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes and staff-work in the political and the military echelons and their interface.
·We found serious failings and flaws in the quality of preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF high command, especially in the Army.
·We found serious failings and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the military echelons.
·We found severe failings and flaws in the defense of the civilian population and in coping with its being attacked by rockets.
·These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the 2nd Lebanon war.
The decision made in the night of July 12th - to react (to the kidnapping) with immediate and substantive military action, and to set for it ambitious goals - limited Israel's range of options. In fact, after the initial decision had been made, Israel had only two main options, each with its coherent internal logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages. The first was a short, painful, strong and unexpected blow on Hizbullah, primarily through standoff fire-power. The second option was to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, including a temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and 'cleaning' it of Hizbullah military infrastructure.
The choice between these options was within the exclusive political discretion of the government; however, the way the original decision to go to war had been made; the fact Israel went to war before it decided which option to select, and without an exit strategy - all these constituted serious failures, which affected the whole war. Responsibility for these failures lay, as we had stressed in the Interim Report, on both the political and the military echelons.
After the initial decision to use military force, and to the very end of the war, this period of 'equivocation' continued, with both the political and the military echelon not deciding between the two options: amplifying the military achievement by a broad military ground offensive, or abstaining from such a move and seeking to end the war quickly. This 'equivocation' did hurt Israel. Despite awareness of this fact, long weeks passed without a serious discussion of these options, and without a decision - one way or the other - between them.
In addition to avoiding a decision about the trajectory of the military action, there was a very long delay in the deployment necessary for an extensive ground offensive, which was another factor limiting Israel's freedom of action and political flexibility: Till the first week of August, Israel did not prepare the military capacity to start a massive ground operation.
As a result, Israel did not stop after its early military achievements, and was 'dragged' into a ground operation only after the political and diplomatic timetable prevented its effective completion. The responsibility for this basic failure in conducting the war lies at the doorstep of both the political and the military echelons.
The overall image of the war was a result of a mixture of flawed conduct of the political and the military echelons and the interface between them, of flawed performance by the IDF, and especially the ground forces, and of deficient Israeli preparedness. Israel did not use its military force well and effectively, despite the fact that it was a limited war initiated by Israel itself. At the end of the day, Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military successes; rather, it relied on a political agreement, which included positive elements for Israel, which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.
This outcome was primarily caused by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theater of operations, of the IDF's readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve a political and diplomatic goal.
All in all, the IDF failed, especially because of the conduct of the high command and the ground forces, to provide an effective military response to the challenge posed to it by the war in Lebanon, and thus failed to provide the political echelon with a military achievement that could have served as the basis for political and diplomatic action. Responsibility for this outcomes lies mainly with the IDF, but the misfit between the mode of action and the goals determined by the political echelon share responsibility.
We should note that, alongside the failures in the IDF performance, there were also important military achievements. Special mention should go to the great willingness of the soldiers, especially reserve soldiers, to serve and fight in the war, as well as the many instances of heroism, courage, self-sacrifice and devotion of many commanders and soldiers.
The air force should be congratulated on very impressive achievements in this war. However, there were those in the IDF high command, joined by some in the political echelon, who entertained a baseless hope that the capabilities of the air force could prove decisive in the war. In fact, the impressive achievements of the air force were necessarily limited, and were eroded by the weaknesses in the overall performance of the IDF.
The "Hannit" episode colored to a large extent the whole performance of the Navy, despite the fact that it made a critical contribution to the naval blockade, and provided the Northern Command with varied effective support of its fighting.
We should also note that the war had significant diplomatic achievements. SC resolution 1701, and the fact it was adopted unanimously, were an achievement for Israel. This conclusion stands even if it turns out that only a part of the stipulations of the resolution were implemented or will be implemented, and even if it could have been foreseen that some of them would not be implemented. This conclusion also does not depend on the intentions or goals of the powers that supported the resolution.
We note, however, that we have seen no serious staff work on Israeli positions in the negotiations. This situation improved in part when the team headed by the prime minister's head of staff was established. The team worked efficiently and with dedication, professionalism and coordination. This could not compensate, however, for the absence of preparatory staff work and discussions in the senior political echelon.
This fact may have much significance to the way Israel conducts negotiations, and to the actual content of the arrangements reached. In such negotiations, decisions are often made that may have far-reaching implications on Israel's interests, including the setting of precedents.
The staff work done in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the adoption of a favorable resolution in the Security Council was, in the main, quick, systematic and efficient. At the same time, for a variety of reasons, it did not reflect clear awareness of the essential need to maintain an effective relationship between military achievements and diplomatic activities.
We now turn to the political and military activity concerning the ground operation at the end of the war. This is one of the central foci of public debate.
True, in hindsight, the large ground operation did not achieve its goals of limiting the rocket fire and changing the picture of the war. It is not clear what the ground operation contributed to speeding up the diplomatic achievement or improving it. It is also unclear to what extent starting the ground offensive affected the reactions of the government of Lebanon and Hezbollah to the ceasefire.
Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the evaluation of these decisions should not be made with hindsight. It cannot depend on the achievements or the costs these decisions in fact had. The evaluation must be based only on the reasons for the operation, and its risks and prospects as they were known - or as they should have been known - when it was decided upon.
Moreover, it is impossible to evaluate the ground operation at the end of the war without recalling the developments that preceded it and the repeated delays in the adoption of the Security Council resolution; and as a part of the overall conduct of the war.
Against this background, we make the following findings on the main decisions:
The cabinet decision of August 9th - to approve in principle the IDF plan, but to authorize the PM and the MOD to decide if and when it should be activated, according to the diplomatic timetable - was almost inevitable, giving the Israeli government necessary military and political flexibility.
The decision to start in fact the ground operation was within the political and professional discretion of its makers, on the basis of the facts before them. The goals of the ground operation were legitimate, and were not exhausted by the wish to hasten or improve the diplomatic achievement. There was no failure in that decision in itself, despite its limited achievements and its painful costs.
Both the position of the Prime minister - who had preferred to avoid the ground operation - and the position of the Minister of Defense - who had thought it would have served Israel's interest to go for it - had been taken on the merits and on the basis of evidence. Both enjoyed serious support among the members of the general staff of the IDF and others. Even if both statesmen took into account political and public concerns - a fact we cannot ascertain - we believe that they both acted out of a strong and sincere perception of what they thought at the time was Israel's interest.
We want to stress: The duty to make these difficult decisions was the political leaders'. The sole test of these decisions is public and political.
At the same time, we also note that:
We have not found within either the political or the military echelons a serious consideration of the question whether it was reasonable to expect military achievements in 60 hours that could have contributed meaningfully to any of the goals of the operation;
We have not found that the political echelon was aware of the details of the fighting in real time, and we have not seen a discussion, in either the political or the military echelons, of the issue of stopping the military operation after the Security Council resolution was adopted;
We have not seen an explanation of the tension between the great effort to get additional time to conclude the first stage of the planned ground operation and the decisions not to go on fighting until the ceasefire itself.
A description of failures in the conduct of war may be regarded as harming Israel. There will be those who may use our findings to hurt Israel and its army. We nonetheless point out these failures and shortcomings because we are certain that only in this way Israel may come out of this ordeal strengthened. We are pleased that processes of repair have already started. We recommend a deep and systematic continuation of such processes.
It is exclusively in the hands of Israeli leaders and public to determine whether, when facing challenges in the future, we will come to them more prepared and ready, and whether we shall cope with them in a more serious and responsible way than the way the decision-makers had acted - in the political and the military echelons -- in the 2nd Lebanon war.
Our recommendations contain suggestions for systemic and deep changes in the modalities of thinking and acting of the political and military echelons and their interface, in both routine and emergency, including war. These are deep and critical processes. Their significance should not be obscured by current affairs, local successes or initial repairs. A persistent and prolonged effort, on many levels, will be needed in order to bring about the essential improvements in the ways of thinking and acting of the political-military systems.
For these reasons we would like to caution against dangers which might upset plans and delay required change processes, and thus produce dangerous results:
Fear of criticism in case of failure may lead to defensive reactions, working by the book, and abstention from making resolute decisions and preferring non-action. Such behavior is undesirable and also dangerous.
In a dynamic complex reality, one should not prepare better for the last war. It is also essential not to limit oneself to superficial action, designed to create an appearance that flaws had been corrected.
It is also essential not to focus exclusively on coping with dangers, but to combine readiness for threat scenarios with an active seeking of opportunities.
When speaking on learning, one should take into account that enemies, too, are learning their lessons.
The 2nd Lebanon War has brought again to the foreground for thought and discussion issues that some parts of Israeli society had preferred to suppress: Israel cannot survive in this region, and cannot live in it in peace or at least non-war, unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings believe that Israel has the political and military leadership, military capabilities, and social robustness that will allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm her, and to prevent them - if necessary through the use of military force - from achieving their goal.
These truths do not depend on one's partisan or political views. Israel must - politically and morally - seek peace with its neighbors and make necessary compromises. At the same time, seeking peace or managing the conflict must come from a position of social, political and military strength, and through the ability and willingness to fight for the state, its values and the security of its population even in the absence of peace.
These truths have profound and far-reaching implications for many dimensions of life in Israel and the ways its challenges are managed.
Beyond examining the way the Lebanon War was planned and conducted; beyond the examination of flaws in decision-making and performance that had been revealed in it - important as they may be;
these are the central questions that the Lebanon war has raised. These are issues that lie at the very essence of our existence here as a Jewish and democratic state. These are the questions we need to concentrate on.
We hope that our findings and conclusions in the Interim and the Final Reports will bring about not only a redress of failings and flaws, but help Israeli society, its leaders and thinkers, to advance the long-term goals of Israel, and develop the appropriate ways to address the challenges and respond to them.
We are grateful for the trust put in us when this difficult task was given to us. If we succeed in facilitating rectification of the failings we have identified - this will be our best reward.
Thank you.
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